Abortion and Soundbites: Why Pro-Choice Arguments Are Harder to Make

51 comments

1. I don`t normally get political on the internet but I just could not keep my mouth shut about these arguments.
   Firstly, although I am pro-life I am not callously indifferent to the suffering that can be caused by unwanted pregnancies. I am an advocate for finding alternative methods for ending pregnancies that do not result in the death of the child, what I am NOT in favor of is necessarily forcing women to carry unwanted pregnancies. But what I am even less in favor of is abortion. I am willing to admit that there are grey areas such as children conceived in rape but I don`t even claim to be able to answer that problem. I just wanted to respond to each point as it was presented so here goes:

   1. If human means biologically human, that means that random human cells and tissues have rights, which they don’t. So just because fetuses are biologically human doesn’t mean they have rights.

   This presents an incomplete picture of how we define a human being. A human body with no brain activity which is being kept alive by machines is not a human being nor is it a person because it is brain dead. However, this is not at all analogous with an unborn child who is too undeveloped to have a brain functions, because the brain dead human adult is not going to become a conscious human being in the near future if only allowed to live on life support a little longer. Human personhood is not defined by biological makeup but by a combination of human biological makeup, consciousness or pending consciousness. Even a child in the first trimester of gestation has attributes which give it strong ontological probability. Would it be permissible to end the life of a brain dead born human being on life support if the medical consensus was that in a matter of months there were a greater than 80% chance that brain function would fully return to this individual? Even if there were a distinct chance that this individual would be mentally retarded to the extent that they would need caring for, what family and what medical professional would sign off on ending this person`s life? Although there is probably no legal precedent for this it seems clear that such an action would be murder.

   2. We can ask why human beings have rights: why do rocks and vegetables not have rights? A long-influential family of theories of rights proposes that we have rights because we are conscious and feeling beings. This theory suggests that pre-conscious embryos and early fetuses don’t have rights.

   Again, this can be answered by saying that although non-conscious objects do not have rights they are not analogous with pre-conscious unborn children because non-conscious objects WILL NEVER be conscious no matter how much time they are given. Medical professionals believe that children in the 2nd and 3rd trimester of gestation display clear signs of consciousness and even begin 1st language acquisition in the womb. So all this argument would leave you with is abortion being permissible only in the 1st trimester of gestation, making huge numbers of abortions the violation of fetal rights.
   Anyway, the elephant in the room here is that by asserting that only consciousness confers one with rights, you are endowing rights to all conscious animals but continuing to farm and eat them. To be consistent all pro choice advocates would have to become vegetarians merely to justify killing unconscious embryos on the basis of their lack of consciousness. Not to mention instigating the emancipation of pets and animals farmed for produce. It still wouldn`t allow you to kill conscious unborn children.

   3. While people say that all human beings have rights, they don’t. Human corpses don’t have rights. Brain-dead human beings do not have the rights we have: letting their bodies die would be wrong if they had, say, the right to life. Babies born missing most of their brains seem to not have the rights that regular babies have: it’s hard to see why letting them die, even when they could be kept alive, would be wrong, since being alive does them no good. Not all human beings have features that rights are supposed to protect, so it seems that not all human beings have rights. So just because fetuses are human beings doesn’t, in itself, mean they have rights.

   As I have already said, anything that lacks consciousness and is not awaiting the highly probable development of consciousness does not have rights. So because fetuses are unique in that they await probable consciousness and personhood they have the same rights that any born human being would have if they too were in the unique situation of awaiting the probable development of a fully functional brain and full consciousness.
   The right to life is not a right to everything someone needs to live—especially someone else’s body. Explaining if, how and why a fetus would have a right to a pregnant woman’s body is a challenge.

   4. If we accept the premise that any being that is conscious or awaiting probable consciousness has a right to live (as we should) then we should consider the following analogy. If a frightened child breaks into a tiny empty lockable room in your small but warm apartment during a blizzard and even though you cannot see the child you cannot stand it being there because you are an extremely private person who hates children, the only way to remove the child is to throw it outside into the storm where it is certain to die in horrible agony. Would you have the right to cause that child`s death just because you value your privacy and he had no right to be in your apartment? Only a evil person would kill a child for violating their right to not have an unwelcome child in their apartment. The right a woman has to an empty womb does not supplant the right of an innocent child to live.
   When we talk about a person`s rights we shouldn`t approach the subject as if it enjoys an unambiguous and non-contentious definition. Are some rights so important and sacred that they cannot sometimes abrogate other rights which they may intersect? Does a drowning man not have the right to climb onto a boat that doesn`t belong to him in order to save his own life? Do the occupants of that boat have the right to throw him back into the shark infested sea because he is a trespasser? Rights are not so simple are they? There are two more things that sometimes matter more than rights: morality and altruism. Do the occupants of the boat have a moral obligation not to throw the stowaway back into the sea to drown, be eaten by sharks, die of thirst or starve? Of course they do no matter how much he has violated their right to privacy. Although not directly analogous with abortion, it illustrates that moral responsibility can abrogate ones` own rights.

   5. Killing random cells, bacteria, plants, etc. is often not wrong at all. There is killing that’s wrong and killing that isn’t wrong: just because abortion is killing doesn’t mean it’s wrong.

   What pro-choice arguments like this invariably do is to deny the personhood of the unborn in order to compare it to the unconscious and the bereft of ontology. Random cells will never fulfill the criteria of personhood if left alone to do so. Neither will bacteria or plants. If the argument here is that if killing that which is not conscious is permissible then that doesn`t allow you to kill children in the 2nd or 3rd trimester of gestation nor does it allow you to kill mosquitoes. If you extend the argument to include living organisms which will very probably achieve consciousness in time, then it should not be permissible to kill a zygote let alone a child who is days from delivery.
   For the above reasons you cannot compare the permissible or even necessary killing of living organisms to the killing of a human being who is awaiting consciousness or personhood be it in the case of unborn children or in the hypothetical case of a born human who is awaiting highly probable consciousness.

   6. It is wrong to kill adults, children and babies because they are conscious, aware and have feelings. Since early fetuses entirely lack these characteristics, it is not inherently wrong to kill them, so most abortions are not morally wrong, since most abortions are done early in pregnancy, before consciousness and feeling develop in the fetus.

   On the first point, abortions are not restricted to early gestation periods. There are established procedures for aborting children in the third trimester and this is what needs to be discussed the most urgently. There has even been talk of killing recently born children. Secondly, it is not good enough to define who deserves to live and die on the merit of consciousness alone because that would make it morally wrong to kill animals for meat. It is the writer who is defining morality based purely on whether it is okay to kill something which is conscious. Moral considerations also encompass moral responsibility, compassion and erring on the side of personhood when the personhood, or lack thereof, of an organism is not established beyond a shadow of a doubt and the definition of personhood is hotly contested by two separate camps on opposing sides of the argument. Additionally, we do not have an even respectable understanding of consciousness which should burden us with a lack of confidence when it comes to declaring the consciousness or lack of consciousness possessed by living organisms. We cannot be sure that animals lack self-consciousness and certainly cannot be sure that early gestational fetuses lack consciousness of any description, even if it is only the capacity to suffer physical pain. Our trust of medical science should be buffered somewhat by our fallibility as a species. If the atheist / materialist adage that we are mere molecules in motion and the products of mindless unguided processes is true, that should saddle us with a lack of confidence about our facility to make literal life or death decisions based on a tenuous and unstable understanding of human consciousness.
   Additionally, is this argument conceding that 2nd and 3rd trimester abortions are unacceptable? Many pro-choice advocates don`t seem to think so.

   7. Furthermore, since the right to life does not include the right to someone else’s body, a fetus might not have the right to the pregnant woman’s body—therefore she has the right to not allow the fetus use of her body. This further justifies abortion, at least until technology allows for the removal of fetuses to other wombs. Since morally permissible actions should be legal, abortions should be legal: it is an injustice to criminalize actions that are not wrong.

   Technically, refugees don`t have the right to flee their war torn countries to enter other countries illegally, but first world countries still have a moral responsibility to allow them to do so. As I have already stated, some rights or lack of rights can be abrogated by a moral responsibility which is more imperative. Using the argument that something is morally permissible presupposes that it SHOULD be morally permissible and is not subject to scrutiny for its ambiguity and the contention it provokes. It was morally permissible to own slaves it is still morally permissible to beat your wife in some countries. There are many issues around which a moral consensus has not been reached. To go ahead and say that abortion is morally permissible is to assert that the moral quality of abortion has been firmly established when it has not. In my mind none of the arguments presented here have established the moral permissibility of abortion and I have explained at great length as to why.

   So for a pro choice advocate to persuade me over to their camp they would need to convince me of the following:
   1. That it would be morally permissible to take the life of a hypothetical child, teenager or adult who lacked brain activity but would very probably achieve consciousness and full cognition if allowed to remain on life support for just a few months.
   2. That in life or death situations one`s rights necessarily abrogate one`s moral responsibility and not the other way around.
   3. That we can be sure beyond a shadow of a doubt that “pre-conscious” fetuses could not possibly be conscious and that we can be sure that neither are they sentient.
   4. That despite the assertion that consciousness confers personhood, conscious fetuses can still be aborted as long as they violate their mother`s right to an empty womb.

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   1. Now here are my questions / challenges for you. They might be easy to answer, I`m not sure as I`m totally new to pro-life apologetics.

      1. Would it be morally permissible to take the life of a hypothetical child, teenager or adult who lacked brain activity but would very probably achieve consciousness and full cognition if allowed to remain on life support for just a few months? If not why should abortion be morally permissible?
      2. Can we be sure beyond a shadow of a doubt that “pre-conscious” fetuses could not possibly be conscious and that we can be sure that neither are they sentient? If not why should abortion be morally permissible?
      3. Despite the concession made by many in the pro-choice camp that consciousness and human physiology confer personhood , can conscious unborn humans still be aborted as long as they violate their mother`s right to an empty womb? If not why should abortion be morally permissible?
      4. If a child is clinging to your ankle to stop it from falling to its death from a tall building, would you be justified in prying its hand open and allowing it to die just because it does not have a right to use your body to survive? Thus, is simply withdrawing the use of your body to allow a helpless person to live not an instigation of their death and therefore not murdering them?
      5. If a drowning man climbs onto a yacht to save his own life- would the owner of the yacht be justified in throwing him overboard to drown, starve, die of thirst or be eaten by sharks just because he has no right to board the yacht? Even if the stow away was temporarily unconscious and slightly increased the yacht`s instability in heavy seas, would it be justifiable to facilitate his death by throwing him back into the water? If not, why is it justifiable to kill an unborn child on the grounds that it is trespassing on the mother`s womb?
      6. Imagine a disabled and helpless child is drowning in shallow water. A man is standing on the shore watching the child drown instead of saving him. Before you can reach the water the child is dead. You demand that the man tells you why he didn`t rescue the child and he tells you that the child did not have the right to use his body to survive. Do you call the police? If not, why not?
      7. Do you think that the three analogies above demonstrate that, in life or death situations, one`s rights can sometimes be abrogated by one`s moral duties or the need to respond to one`s moral intuitions? If not, explain why.
      8. Can we be certain that fetuses don`t feel pain when they are being aborted? If we cannot be certain that they do not feel pain, should we not err on the side of them feeling pain, lest we inflict unspeakable cruelty on millions of children? If we can be certain, please submit recent scientific literature to back it up.
      9. Would it be acceptable to kill a newborn child whose cerebral development was delayed but in progress? If not, why is it acceptable to kill an unborn child whose cerebral development is in progress?
      10. If a child is born prematurely to rich but unwilling parents. The parents have to pay thousands of dollars a week to keep it alive in an incubator, would it be permissible for the parents to request that the child is allowed to die outside the incubator? If not, why is it permissible to allow a child of the same age to be aborted because the mother does not want to “pay” for it with the use of her body?
      11. (Response to “Violinist” analogy) If a pair of conjoined twins wants to be disconnected from each other but separation would result in the certain death of one of them because they share a heart; which one should die? The weaker one or the one who objects less to being conjoined? If it is acceptable to allow a conscious person to die because you don`t want them to be connected to your body, you must choose. Let`s suppose that there will be a way to separate the twins without killing either of them but they will have to join a waiting list for nine months in order to have the surgery. Alternatively, surgery which guarantees the death of the weaker twin can be performed straight away. I wonder if such surgery would be legally permitted considering the availability of an alternative surgery which guarantees the survival of both twins. Even if the former surgery merely risked the death of the weaker twin, would it be permissible given the safer alternative? You could circumvent this argument by saying “What if the weaker twin had no brain activity?” But that`s not what the famous violinist analogy seems to posit. It portrays the fetus as a conscious human person who only temporarily needs to be connected to its mother, but has no right to be connected to her. And if you were to throw a factor like cerebral activity into the twin analogy it wouldn`t change it a whole lot. So what if one of the twins has no cerebral activity but will soon? Would it be okay to perform a separation which guarantees its death based purely on the premise that it violates the bodily rights of the other, stronger and currently cerebrally functioning twin?

      12. Are future humans persons? If they are not, why do they have a right to have a habitable planet left behind for them by this generation? Do not only persons have rights? If they do not even exist yet, but billions of them certainly will, why should we care about whether they live or die? If they are persons, why are fertilized human eggs which exist in the present not persons? If we had to make huge sacrifices in order to ensure the survival of other human beings whose grandparents have not even been conceived yet, would it be morally justifiable to not make such sacrifices and allow environmental conditions to emerge that would be life prohibiting for humans living 200 years from now on the grounds that they do not even exist yet? If it would be immoral to ensure the deaths of millions of currently non-existent human persons, why is it not immoral to ensure the deaths of millions of currently existing human persons? How can a future human being be a person when they don`t currently exist, but a fertilized egg not be a person when they do currently exist? If you could avoid an action in the present which you knew somehow would kill a good and kind person living 100 years from now, would you bother avoiding it? If you would, why would you kill a viable fetus which exists in the present? If you wouldn`t, aren`t you knowingly instigating the death of a good and kind person at a stage in their life when their personhood is beyond dispute?

      13. Does the love of expecting parents confer an early term child with personhood? If so, why does the consciousness of a human being relate to whether they are a person or not? If not, should violently causing a miscarriage be considered grievous bodily harm rather than murder in spite of the mother`s love for the child she was carrying? If so, is the mother of the child suffering from a delusion when she insists that the baby she lost was a person whom she loved? If the family of the early term child insists that the baby they were eagerly waiting for was murdered and the perpetrator must be tried for murder, should we tell them that they are all also suffering from a delusion? If not, given that causing of a woman to miscarry an early term pregnancy on purpose should be considered murder, are you not agreeing with the parents and family of the miscarried child that the child was a person? If you agree that the pre-conscious child was conferred personhood by the love of its family are you not saying that personhood sometimes has nothing to do with currently existing consciousness? However, if you think that the parents and family of the miscarried child are in fact delusional when they insist that the child was a person, are you saying that billions of people across the globe are suffering from mental illness when they celebrate their own pregnancy, their wife`s pregnancy or the pregnancy of a friend or family member? Why not? Are they not suffering from a delusion that an early term child is a person?

      So what have I said? That as long as a child is unloved and unconscious you can kill it? No, because for one thing my contention is that expected consciousness also confers personhood. The question “Does the love of expecting parents confer an early term child with personhood?” is intended to illustrate my opinion that consciousness is not a requirement of personhood. Do you agree?

      As I see it, you are left with two ways of responding to this.
      A. Given that the pre-conscious child is conferred personhood by the love of the family which awaits it, killing it would be murder because killing a human person is murder. Therefore a human being does not need to have consciousness to be a person. Therefore deliberately and unnecessarily killing an unconscious human being is murder. Therefore abortion is murder at any stage of pregnancy.

      OR:

      B. Anyone who rejoices in their own pregnancy, the pregnancy of their wife, family member or friend is suffering from a delusion because they treat a non-existent person as an existent person and even go so far as to feel love for it. (If you are an atheist you would perhaps consider this idea analogous with the belief in a deity)

      Unless… you can prove that most people in this situation don`t believe that the baby that they eagerly await is a person, and they are simply rejoicing in the existence of a bunch of cells. A bunch of cells for whom they are buying toys, clothes, cribs, high chairs and the kind of things that you would normally buy for a human person. You would also need to demonstrate that most expecting parents do not love their unborn fetus with a greater intensity than they would love a co-worker, friend or even close family member.

      14. If pregnant women should have bodily autonomy, should it be permissible for a pregnant woman not seeking abortion to use her body in ways which she knows will damage her fetus such as smoking? Given that her activities may subject her child to a life of brain damage, deformity, disability or illness is it morally permissible for her to ruin the life of a future human being? If not, why does the fetus suddenly have rights even though it is “not a person” and only persons have rights? Are you not also denying a woman the right to do what she wants with her body by telling her she is not allowed to condemn a human being to a life of suffering by using her body irresponsibly? If it should be permissible explain why a woman has the right to risk ruining her child`s life while it is in the womb, but not to risk ruining it after it has been born given that the consequences are likely to impact the child in the same way in either case.

      14.b. If you were not challenged by question 14: Imagine you are brain damaged, deformed, disabled or chronically sick. You find out from a doctor that your affliction was caused by your mother engaging in substance abuse when you were a fetus and this is confirmed by a video emerging of her taking drugs and talking about her pregnancy. Would you sue her? If your answer is yes, does that not demonstrate that she had no right to ruin your life when you were a fetus and that you had a right to not have your life ruined when you were a fetus? If you had rights as a fetus then were you not technically a person as only persons have rights? Therefore is a fetus not a person? If a fetus has a right to not be poisoned and subjected to a future of suffering, does it not have a right to not be killed? Would you not have had a right to a future just because your future was ruined when you were a fetus? Does a fetus then not have the right to a future? If you wouldn`t sue her or take any other action against her, would you not be declaring that it is okay to subject a human being to a life of suffering in order to enjoy your bodily rights? Would you be okay with other people suffering in the same way that you have so that a pregnant mother can smoke crack if she feels like it? If not please explain why.
      It seems to me that if you think it`s unacceptable for a pregnant women to use her body in ways which risk damaging her fetus, which may suffer for it when it is no longer a fetus, you are admitting that a fetus has rights and is therefore a person. At the very least you concede that the person the fetus will become has rights which can still be violated when it is a fetus, therefore it also had rights when it was a fetus as its rights can`t be violated if it doesn`t have them. If you support a pregnant woman`s right to use her body in ways which may damage her fetus you are declaring that one person has the right to subject another person to a life of horrible suffering for the crime of needing her body to survive, which is an evil thing to believe.
      Or would you argue that a fetus has no rights if it is not allowed to survive long enough to exercise them? Well that only proves that you can take someone`s rights away from them by killing them, not that you should. Nor would that prove that personhood and the rights associated with it do not precede consciousness whether or not a fetus is allowed to live.

      15. Should it be considered ethical to perform an abortion on a mother with multiple personality disorder, bi-polar disorder or other similar serious mental illnesses? What if one of the personalities of the mother wants to be a mother but another personality doesn`t? What if a mother with bi-polar disorder wants to have the child when she`s manic but wants to abort it when she`s depressed? If you think the abortion should be performed, would aborting the child not be unspeakably cruel to the mother`s personality who wants to have the child and not aborting it be a violation of the rights of the personality who doesn`t want to have it? If you don`t think an abortion should be performed on such a mother are you not saying that mentally ill women don`t have the right to an abortion and therefore are stripped of their bodily rights? Do you agree that this demonstrates that there are situations in which abortion is immoral and unethical completely apart from considerations about the personhood and rights of the child? Do you also agree that in some situations bodily rights can be withheld for the sake of the mother and not the child? Do you also agree that the mother would be within her rights to sue an obstetrician for aborting a child she desperately wanted to raise at the behest of one of her other personalities who wanted to kill the child? Would you also consider the mother`s agony at the unwanted abortion to be a product of her mental illness or the natural bereavement over a deceased person? If not, please explain.

      16. If a mother who has a fetus aborted is haunted by regrets and traumatized by the experience of the abortion, is she being irrational as the fetus was not a person? If she actively mourns the death of the fetus and requests to have the dead fetus returned to her so she can bury or cremate it in a formal funeral service, is she deluded? If not then aren`t you conceding that her fetus was a person because mentally healthy people do not have funerals for plants or pets. If you think she is deluded and you could go back in time would you discourage her from having the abortion knowing that it would drive her insane and ruin her life? On a personal note, this really happened to a friend of mine and I wished I had talked her out of the abortion. If you really want to know why I`m pro-life.

      Does this not show that either a) A persons` need to respectfully bury a deceased loved normally extends to people they considered to be persons and so if a mother wishes to bury her aborted fetus you must concede that the fetus was a person or that the mother is mentally disturbed. Or b) That some women`s lives are more likely to be ruined by having an abortion than they are by giving birth to a child, so can we not make a case for stopping abortions in order to protect woman as well as unborn children?

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   2. An interesting list. And then there’s the fact that if you harm a pregnant woman such that she miscarries, you can be charged with murder. Murder? Only people can be murdered.

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   3. Thank you for these interesting observations and questions, which I only noticed over a month after you posted them. (This system doesn’t alert us to these comments). I will try to respond to them when I have time. In the meantime, I’ll note that our short book addresses some of the questions you raise here and it can be used to develop answers to some of the other questions. It’s at http://www.AbortionArguments.com Thanks!
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4. The pro-life position is much more easily defensible, and more technically/scientifically correct. However, I think the pro-choice position is more practically correct, at least for early pregnancy stages, so I am pro-choice.

   The argument that people should be able to have abortions because the baby doesn’t have a right to the mother’s body strikes me as stupid. Parents have a legal obligation to keep their children alive and healthy, and their bodies are required for them to do this. They legally must use their bodies to feed their children, bathe their children, etc. and/or put their bodies to work to earn money to pay someone else to do these things. It is not legal to kill one’s children or to allow them to die via neglect.

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   1. From the perspective of incentive-setting, this sounds like a strong anti-natalist position. You’re severely punishing people for causing conception at all. It’s hard to call that a “pro-life” position, considering that people who don’t have unprotected coitus will never be faced with these severe disincentives, even though all their children are technically also dead.

   2. You mean incentive to have children? You’re saying that you don’t think parents should be legally responsible for their children’s lives?

      I’m not sure it makes sense to call something that never existed dead. I think for something to be dead it has to have been alive first, or at least it has to have existed.

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   3. I think there’s a weird bias in common sense morality that nonexistence from never coming into existence is seen as much better than nonexistence from coming into existence and then being erased from existence again. It doesn’t matter if you call that “dead” or not, the point is that the end result, nonexistence, life-years not lived, is equivalent.

      Of course I understand that we need laws against murder, so we can live without having to anticipate people murdering us without consequence. But this bias seems to go beyond that function. Of course, you could argue that being born is unpleasant and death is unpleasant as well, so that never coming into existence is less painful.

      An alternative to decades of child support obligations would be that the relationship between parents and children could be seen as mutually voluntary. In my ideal world, all relationships should be based in consent and even young people should have the right to obtain painless suicide methods if they want to choose nonexistence for themselves. Then again, I’m also for the legalization of consensual child labor and prostitution, so my ideal world is far away from the common Overton Window. I don’t care enough to go to a culture war over it, but I do care enough about my own personal self-determination rights that I reserve the right to cause arbitrary harm to people who deny me my right to die painlessly at any time I choose. Also, following the current incentive structure, I don’t support any children. The taxation I’m being forced to pay for poor kids has resulted, among other things, in reduced productivity on my end – no one has ever blamed me for that. It’s a weird way to set incentives is all I’m trying to say.

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   4. In my opinion that’s really fucked up.

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   5. And why should I care about your opinion? Common sense morality is riddled with inconsistencies and arbitrary biases, and moral realism is false anyway.

      In my opinion the majority’s position is really fucked up, but not a single person cares about my opinion unless I set a hard incentive gradient to back it up, so that’s what I do.

      I give zero shits about your status attacks, they can’t replace arguments, they convey no information other than hostility and they don’t even address the inconsistencies I’ve mentioned.

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   6. Fine by me. I’m not interested in debating incentive gradients of child prostitution.

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   7. I’m one of those people who find moral calculations to be abhorrent. We are not reducible to spreadsheets. Thus I can’t really discuss the subject with our friend, who thinks that the only morality is a reciprocation contract.

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   8. No one forces you to debate. However, I will point out that child labor is in fact socially accepted. The shooting of Stranger Things was child labor. It just happened to be a form of high-status child labor that the majority selfishly wanted, so people don’t call it child labor, which has a negative connotation.This is not about principles, but about framing.

      As for reciprocation contract, I personally harm the interests of those who harm my interests whether or not they agree on the principle. No one has to consent to be my enemy, in fact they don’t even have to understand why. I’m just kind enough to let people know, and I dislike preference falsification so I don’t lie about what I want. It’s very easy to use that as a status attack and declare oneself morally superior over me, but that doesn’t make the retaliation costs go away. Moralism isn’t a mind-control spell that makes harming people’s personal preferences a free action. I control my agency, you control yours only. It still amazes me how many people don’t understand something this basic.

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   9. Thank you for reading and for your comments. To respond to one of them, there do seem to be relevant differences between, on the one hand, babies and children and, on the other, embryos and early fetuses. So what’s true of babies and children (e.g., that they have rights to be taken care of and that parents – or someone – is obligated to take care of them) need not apply to early fetuses. We discuss why it’s at least a stretch – if not a mistake – to call early fetuses “babies” — and reason that what’s true of babies and children is also true of fetuses – in the first section of our book here: https://www.abortionarguments.com/p/full-text.html#defining

      Thanks!

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   10. Well it always comes down to whether or not fetuses are considered to be human beings or not (which technically they are and practically they are not). But the argument that people cannot be legally forced to used their bodies to enable the survival of other human beings that are dependent on them is invalid, as this is already the law for post-birth humans.

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   11. I wonder if attempts to calculate when human life starts, tho they might be necessary for the law — just as we decide when you’re old enough to drive — are not really the point. It seems to me the point is that it is abhorrent that a woman should want to violate the very thing that makes her special and that nature intends her to do. We have to be practical of course — very few any longer have an issue with contraception and early abortions are a sensible compromise, but when a woman wants her newborn killed, surely that is deeply disturbing? Surely mother-love is the prototype on which all loves are modeled? I once heard a quote that it’s not that abortion should be illegal, but that it should be unthinkable. A culture that trivializes abortion is dehumanized.

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   12. I don`t think it`s helpful to posit distinctions between different developmental stages of human beings in order to ascribe less value to one than to another. If we are talking about that which will almost certainly ascend developmental stages if allowed to continue living then we are talking about human persons as whole and the rights and value that personhood entails. I don`t think that one developmental stage has more intrinsic value than another although human beings in certain stages of development require a higher level of nurturing and protection and therefore should be viewed as more vulnerable. This vulnerability should be seen as a motivation to protect, not seized upon as an opportunity to destroy. What if a born child has the attributes of a fetus after birth but would certainly develop delayed attributes of a newborn given time? Is it not still a newborn child who merely has the attributes of a fetus? Is a fetus not a human being who simply has the attributes of a fetus? Are you not a human being who simply has the attributes of an adult? If you were an adult who had the exact attributes of a fetus (including your expected development into an adult baby) could we kill you? I don`t see that your stage of development confers your right to live or die. Additionally, much of what`s true of babies and children is true of fetuses; Its complex anthropomorphism, its internal complexity, its requirements, its DNA, its genes and so on. How little do fetuses have to be like babies and children in order for us to justify killing them? Yet an iguana is virtually nothing at all like a human child yet brutally and cruelly killing one would go against every moral intuition of a sane individual. “Consciousness” you might say. As I explained in the longer comment I posted, as consciousness is a highly probable future attribute of a fetus, not allowing consciousness to develop in a fetus would be like treating a newborn child who`s consciousness is delayed as having the attributes of a unborn fetus and killing it. Would your conviction as a pro-choice advocate allow you to kill a newborn with the attributes of a fetus?

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5. You could not be more wrong. Complex argument is only valuable after the overarching issue has been framed. That the conflict is framed as “life” versus “choice” was always going to be a problem for those that think abortion should be a safe and legal option. Those that want to keep abortion legal should emphasize life again. A world without legal abortion means more women’s lives will be in danger. It will force the practice underground. It really is that simple. Life for many woman can be hard. We should not make it harder.

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   1. Thanks for your response, but I think you have offered up another soundbite that is also likely to be ineffective. Here’s a paragraph from our book about that:

      “4.2.2.4 “Women and girls will die if abortion isn’t allowed.”

      Historically, this has been true, and is likely to remain the case. However, this fact is apt to not be persuasive to some people who believe that abortion is wrong: they will respond, “If someone dies because they are doing something wrong like having an abortion, that’s ‘on them,’ not those who are trying to prevent that wrong.” Observing that women will die if abortions are outlawed doesn’t engage any arguments that abortion is wrong or give much of a reason to think that abortion is not wrong. Again, this type of engagement is necessary for progress on these issues.”

      Thanks!

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   2. Exactly. Men are often injured themselves while beating their wives, therefore safe, legal, professional wife beaters should be licensed to beat wives. No more back-alley wife beating! The meth industry is rife with violence (see ‘Breaking Bad’) simply because it is forced underground. Make pushing meth legal and all this back-alley murder will end.

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   3. Thanks for your response. For what it’s worth, if I understand what you are saying, your response *appears* to be “question-begging” or merely assuming that abortion is wrong: at least, that’s what I think is suggested by what you are saying and the way you are saying it. There’s a discussion of question begging arguments on all sides of these issues here:

      https://www.abortionarguments.com/p/full-text.html#bad

      Thanks!

   4. “if I understand what you are saying, your response *appears* to be “question-begging””

      I’d call it a reducto ad absurdum no? I’m only pointing out that the idea that any law, the breaking of which can result in harm to the criminal, is not sufficient grounds to abolish that law. It is something to be considered however. Prohibition was enacted with the best of intentions but by pushing booze underground it fomented crime, and that was sufficient reason to repeal prohibition. But few would say it’s sufficient reason to legalize meth sales, yes? Thus, giving women legal abortions will no doubt save ‘back-alley’ abortions, but it will also result in the death of many innocent babies-to-be. I myself think there is no simple answer.

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7. “If human means biologically human, that means that random human cells and tissues have rights, which they don’t. ”

   Surely the ordinary meaning of “human” in this argument is “living human being” or “living member of the human species.” Your view is that only the (dispositionally) conscious, feeling human beings have rights, while the (dispositionally) unconscious, unfeeling members don’t. The other side grants rights to all human beings, conscious and feeling or not. The dispute hinges on the moral importance of consciousness and feeling, and the right answer doesn’t strike me as obvious.

   Having said that, most of this piece is a model of honesty and fair thinking, a very nice contribution in a public forum on a difficult question.

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   1. Thank you for your kind words!

      And we can only hope that more people, when they say ‘human’, they say the better words that they might really mean to be saying: that can only help.

8. The book, while worth reading, made the mistake of not starting at the level of how we justify moral beliefs in the first place. You need a story that can withstand laypeople’s objections. The main reason why people I know are hesitant to get into disputes with pro-life people is because the conversation basically always ends up at an impasse when the pro-lifer asks, “How do we have objective ethics without God?” If the answer appeals to Aristotle, Kant, or Mill, even assuming that they had arguments that could furnish that, anyone not intimidated by an appeal to a Great Philosopher can just ask, “Okay, now in your own words, can you explain why someone should believe that?” The project of finding good pro-choice arguments should start with an anti-skeptical beginning, and the best results are probably going to be secured by the fastest growing view in moral epistemology: ethical intuitionism. If ethical intuitions aren’t respectable, neither are intuitions about what constitutes a person. Since the whole enterprise lives or dies with intuitions, unabashedly start there. Anything less and the whole idea of “we need strong arguments and evidence” is basically just boilerplate for a Philosophy 101 flier (which will likely also ignore intuitionism).

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   1. Thanks for your observations. Probably *most* writings on practical ethics do not discuss how we justify moral beliefs in the first place: in making arguments they often appeal to intuitions about cases, and the principles and reasons that can be used to justify those initial intuitions. So, to use on example you mention, many people have the “intuition” that their personhood would end at death and, as we suggest, their reasons for that can be used to give insight into the nature of personhood. So, yes, there is a sense in which the book is based on a kind of intuitionism, as well as some other insights that are related to some of the moral theories you mention.

      About religious ethics, we do have a brief discussion of the Euthyphro problem and how the question you report that people often ask can be answered. And we hope the discussion in the book, although brief, gives *some* demonstration about what “strong arguments and evidence” looks like.

      Thanks for reading!

9. “It is wrong to kill adults, children and babies because they are conscious, aware and have feelings.”

   That would imply that killing nonhuman animals is also wrong, at least those that are conscious, aware and have feelings.

   A better norm from my perspective is that killing adults and children against their will should be illegal and socially punished, because it violates their strong personal preferences and we should have norms and laws against violating people’s strong personal preferences. Killing babies should be illegal and socially punished if there are people who have a legitimate claim and a strong personal preference that the baby not be killed, e.g. if the baby’s parents don’t want it to be killed. (Babies themselves don’t have strong personal preferences yet, at least not in a way they can’t articulate; they also don’t understand death yet, which means they don’t have a personal preference against death.)

   This can be applied consistently to nonhuman animals as well without invoking speciesism: I wouldn’t kill your dog against your wishes because you have a legitimate claim and a personal preference that the dog not be killed, but I have no problem with the killing of factory-farmed animals.

   Similarly, I have no problem if people want to abort their fetuses, but I would have a problem if people wanted to abort other people’s fetuses against their will.

   Of course, an implication of this norm would be that people can kill their own babies even after birth as long as the baby doesn’t yet have a personal preference to not die. That implication is outside the current Overton Window, but I’d be willing to bite this bullet.

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   1. This is the property argument. If I kill your dog I’ve robbed you of your property. If I kill your fetus against your will, likewise, but if you want neither the dog nor the fetus, then killing either is ok. As you say, by this logic, killing a newborn is also fine if it is not wanted. This morality was common in ancient times. But the situation changes when the child develops a strong personal preference to live but this does not apply to animals even tho they develop very SPPTL as a matter of course. An amoeba demonstrates SPPTL. But the amoeba is not conscious perhaps you will say — it has no fear of death.

      Then would it be ok to terminate an unwanted person if they were unconscious at the time? And if a newborn baby is only property, at what point does it in effect become ‘it’s own property’ and thus have the right to life? Slave owners faced this problem by simply saying that one’s property is always one’s property, thus the children of your slaves remain your slaves for their whole lives. The children do not belong to their parents because the latter are themselves property and property can’t own property.

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   2. Some good points. I don’t agree that nonhuman animals ever show a SPPTL. First of all, they are not persons. Secondly, I think that’s a misunderstanding of their behavior. They show evolved aversions to the *correlating stimuli* of impending death, such as pain, fear, deprivation, hunger, thirst, etc. But ironically, death actually erases all those negative stimuli from their consciousness when their brain functions shut down permanently. Nonhuman animals don’t have the necessary intelligence to conceptualize death robustly enough to have an actual preference for life over death. The same is true for newborns and perhaps very small children. Of course, this line of argument is a little vague since many adults have beliefs that undermine the informedness of their preference, such as belief in a false afterlife. So it’s not all-or-nothing.

      As for where to draw the line in development, I don’t think there are absolutes at all. I’m not a moral realist and I’m more interested in pragmatic coordination of our mutual interests as I am in moral absolutes. I was also just faced again with people who wished for me to be tortured and murdered online; this always reminds me that maybe their torture and murder is okay also, and I have no reciprocal or otherwise self-interested reason in preventing that. It just seems a gross coordination failure of human mutual interests to live in a state where there are no norms against torture or murder. If it had been reciprocated, I’d say once a person can articulate a preference to not die, such as “Mommy, I don’t want to die”, perhaps don’t murder them? But I’m sure one could come up with counter-arguments even for that, in some hypothetical situations.

      As for the unconscious unwanted person, I’d suggest if they had a previous preference, going with that seems doable and sensible. If they can be woken up again within pragmatic time frames, asking them seems better than overruling their determinable or previous preferences. Of course, this too depends on reciprocity; as a non-altruistic reciprocator, I no longer have a reason to care about most people’s preferences or rights if most people don’t care about my preferences or rights. I don’t think we have a robust human rights consensus and maybe we should just update our moralism talk accordingly. I don’t intrinsically care about fetuses, or other adults for that matter.

   3. “as a non-altruistic reciprocator, I no longer have a reason to care about most people’s preferences or rights if most people don’t care about my preferences or rights”

      That’s at least honestly put. I believe that although pro-choice folks often like to posture themselves as being concerned about others — the ‘rights’ of wimin — I suspect that what’s really going on is that we the born no longer have any concerns about being fetuses again, so … to hell with fetuses. As you say, I can never enter into reciprocation with a fetus, therefore I have no reason to give a damn about fetuses. Ayn Rand would agree with this morality: only greed is real and even when we might appear to be doing something for someone else, it’s really just more greed.

      Perhaps it boils down to simple ethical preference which is comparable to an aesthetic preference: I find greed to be disgusting, and I measure a civilization by how it treats the most defenseless within it, and the unborn are the most defenseless. At some point it simply can’t be debated: some people want to be hyenas and some don’t.

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   4. It still is the case that no fetus has a preference to not be aborted. No fetus is against abortion, including his or her own abortion. Preferences to live only develop later. You can use hindsight, but even that doesn’t give you pro-life: In hindsight, I would have preferred to be aborted as a fetus.

      It still is also the case that we could have had human rights standards to not violate each other’s personal preferences, and I would have reciprocated it if we had had them. And of course you are violating women’s personal preferences in order to impose your ethical preference which is comparable to an aesthetic preference on them. I’ve seen the same in animal rights activists: Be a vegan or you don’t deserve human rights. This sort of behavior is why I don’t support their human rights anymore. That would have required reciprocity. It’s a bad equilibrium of course; now they get neither my support for animal rights nor for their own human rights, which they could have had if they had supported my rights.

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   5. Thanks for these thoughts. Appeals to preferences are related to appeals about consciousness, feelings and so on: at least if you have the former, you have the latter and, as we describe the latter, that entails having the former also.

      But don’t dogs and other at least mammals and birds typically have preferences? (E.g., the would generally prefer to not be in a tiny, tiny cage, compared to being in such a cage?) And don’t babies typically have preferences also? (For example, they would prefer to be, say, warm than very, very cold?). If not, you might have a very “heady” idea about preferences that doesn’t distinguish (A) having preferences and (B) articulating those preferences. It seems someone can have preferences but not articulate them. Does that seem mistaken?

      Thanks!

   6. You’re right. However, no fetus has a preference to not be aborted. I don’t believe in the right to X for beings who have no preference for X. Furthermore, and I didn’t make this explicit enough, I don’t believe in rights for beings who don’t have the basic intelligence needed to reciprocate the rights norm. This is usually connected to being a person, in our current world being a human of sufficient cognitive development. The reason for this is that rights, to me at least, are less moral concepts than coordination tools for our mutual interests; I’m interested in human rights only if they benefit me and the people who’ve net-benefited me. That requires both an understanding of the norm and an actual willingness to abide by it. However, it doesn’t have to extended to non-reciprocators such as nonhuman animals, far-future generations, or people who laugh in your face if you tell them you have rights. Or human fetuses who don’t understand the concept. One complication with this reciprocity-based view is that we may personally lose our intelligence and we may still want norms to not be tortured in that case. But we can solve this by simply enhancing the norm to respect the articulated or deducible preferences of beings who were once people who supported this norm.

10. For a pair of philosophy profs arguing for a more philosophical perspective, you could use some basic philosophical rigour. At the very least, a principled defence of abortion requires an argument from principles that your audience accepts. Instead, you’ve conflated legal, moral, and practical principles together, and then mixed these with empirical claims and rhetorical moves, creating a confusing casuistic stew. Take this point:

    (1a) If human means biologically human, (1b) that means that random human cells and tissues have rights, which they don’t. (1c) So just because fetuses are biologically human doesn’t mean they have rights.

    The first inference (in 1b) is a reductio ad absurdum of 1a that begs the question. The moral (and legal status) of the fetus as a person is precisely the point at issue. You’ve merely asserted (implicitly and without argument) that the fetus is “random cells and tissues” to get the absurdity. But we are all just random cells and tissues. You haven’t touched the central claim of anti-abortionists because you haven’t shown that fetuses differ from babies in a categorical way—i.e., you haven’t shown a morally and legally significant difference like the one between, say, a dead body and a living human being.

    I realize that you later introduce the sentience argument to make this categorical distinction:

    (1a) ….A long-influential family of theories of rights proposes that we have rights because we are conscious and feeling beings. This theory suggests that pre-conscious embryos and early fetuses don’t have rights.

    A theory suggests, does it? Oh, sorry, I didn’t realize it was a “long-influential family of theories.” Had I fully appreciated that argument-by-adjective on the first reading my skepticism would have washed away like leaves in the autumnal rain. Seriously, let me put it to you bluntly: We’re talking about who gets rights and who dies and you’re bloviating about what “influential theories….suggest,” theories that you don’t name or offer me any reason to give a shit about. That’s an appeal to false authority. I read that as “Here’s a useful tactic: Invoke unnamed theories of rights that support your point.”

    So what are these theories and why should I be persuaded by them? What’s wrong with my theory of rights that doesn’t rely on sentience as a criterion? This point does nothing to clear things up:

    While people say that all human beings have rights, they don’t. Human corpses don’t have rights. Brain-dead human beings do not have the rights we have: letting their bodies die would be wrong if they had, say, the right to life. Babies born missing most of their brains seem to not have the rights that regular babies have: it’s hard to see why letting them die, even when they could be kept alive, would be wrong, since being alive does them no good. Not all human beings have features that rights are supposed to protect, so it seems that not all human beings have rights. So just because fetuses are human beings doesn’t, in itself, mean they have rights.
    Are you talking about laws, morals, facts about laws and morals, or all these things? I can’t tell, though it doesn’t matter because all the propositional content is linked with conditional and speculative connectors “seems / if / hard to see why” and the main terms are ambiguous and multivalent, mostly because of the context in which they’re used: human being, human corpses (in the context of rights), brain-dead human beings, right to life, babies (in various states of disrepair), etc.

    Another bit:

    The right to life is not a right to everything someone needs to live—especially someone else’s body. Explaining if, how and why a fetus would have a right to a pregnant woman’s body is a challenge.

    It might be a challenge if babies self-generated, but they don’t. You only get babies when you engage in action likely to create them. Of course, nothing’s so simple as that in law or morals, and I don’t know which we’re talking about here, so I’ll leave it there.

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    1. Hi, thanks for this interesting reaction.

       You say a lot, but I’ll just respond to the first main objection, since that gets things going. You write “You’ve merely asserted (implicitly and without argument) that the fetus is “random cells and tissues” to get the absurdity.”

       It’s worth observing that this is factually incorrect: we did not *assert* that the fetus is a “random [human] cells.” We observed that *if* someone says that anything human has rights, we can ask what’s meant by ‘human,’ and *if* human means ‘biologically human’ then that suggests that “random [human] cells” have rights.

       No where is there an assertion that the fetus is “random cells and tissues.” Correct?

       Thanks!

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11. I’d be interested in reading the authors’ explanation of how a partial birth abortion is not morally problematical.

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    1. Ray, this issue is addressed on pp. 51-52 of their e-book (which is free). They acknowledge that late-term abortions are morally problematic. Personally, I would support a ban on abortion after twenty weeks (with very limited medical exceptions) in exchange for easy access to abortion before that point. This is the situation in most Western European countries.

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    2. Mornin’ K, nice to see you here. Helen should get more support. I agree with your stance. The quest for a moral formula that provides a nice neat answer is doomed to fail. There are only difficult compromises. Abortion is the extinguishing of a life-to-be that has already started, it is nothing like an appendectomy. It is anathema to the modern feminist that she should ever have responsibilities and duties, she has only rites and pleasures. Yet the obvious fact is that an unwanted pregnancy is a huge burden and we should face that. Asking a raped 12 year old to carry a pregnancy is almost grotesque. Forcing life on a fetus known to be deformed is also grotesque. So yeah, the morning after pill, no questions asked, first trimester, hang down your head in shame, but yes, no questions asked. But as time goes on it gets closer and closer to just plain murder and a line must be drawn. Seems they were floating the idea of permitting infanticide in some states a while back.

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12. That is a well written article. I like the level of honour and commitment to truth as opposed to enmity and manipulating a win. I have 2 questions from someone perhaps on the other side of the fence. I was raised in your average liberal atheist home and have become critical of abortions from a lot of reflecting and thinking. This process has been unsettling to my previous outlook but that’s life sometimes.

    Consciousness, when temporary, is not a bar used to measure moral worth. I’m sure you’ve thought about a knocked out person before and our imperative to help them, as opposed to doing what we feel like. I’ll try to hit closer to the mark.

    If you were in a Coma for a year, and would wake up with severe mental and physical disabilities, but you could over 2 decades work back to full health with out disability, and have the opportunity for a fulfilling life afterwards, would you want to live through that coma?

    Question 2 is that if a child did not choose to be created by the couple, does the couple not have a duty to fulfill their obligation to the life they created? The “Right to use another’s body” argument cuts both ways when life and death decisions are made about the fetus’ body.

    That obviously leads to a discussion about the nature of human rights and precludes rape as a factor, but I wanted to hit those two bullet points on the main themes.

    Thanks again for the article and I look forward to reading your short to understand better details. Now it’s time to get ready for work.

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    1. Great reply to the two main arguments. What’s also interesting about the “consciousness = moral worth” argument is that with a bit of thought, it starts to become very uncomfortable, since we don’t really have a good grasp of what consciousness/thoughts/feelings *are*. In terms of arguing for pro-choice, it essentially becomes “stop eating meat, or be pro-life.”

       I think morally, we’re on much safer ground sticking with “potential for humanity”. A person in a coma, asleep, or in the fetal stage of development, all have the potential to *be* human, in a way that a brain-dead body, or sperm cell do not. We can go back and forth as to how much impairment really qualifies, but in philosophical terms, we can draw a much clearer line that is generally recognized as safe, to borrow a term.

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    2. Thanks for this suggestion about appealing to “potential.” I will note that appealing to “potential” at least sometimes seems to be a problematic move. Here’s a section from the book on that:

       “5.1.4 Fetuses are potential persons

       If fetuses aren’t persons, they are at least potential persons, meaning they could and would become persons. This is true. This, however, doesn’t mean that they currently have the rights of persons because, in general, potential things of a kind don’t have the rights of actual things of that kind: potential doctors, lawyers, judges, presidents, voters, veterans, adults, parents, spouses, graduates, moral reasoners and more don’t have the rights of actual individuals of those kinds.”

       It’s also important to note that the “potentials” for sleeping people and never-been-conscious fetuses are different. The sleeper has the potential to pretty quickly return to past consciousness, whereas the fetus doesn’t have that. Perhaps that makes a difference?

       Thanks!

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    3. I think you’re equivocating with the word “potential” there. The sleeper, and the fetus, given the requisites for life, *will* both become conscious human beings. A “potential doctor” will not become a doctor until they are certified to have the necessary knowledge. A more reasonable analogy would be that of the elected president prior to assuming office. We understand that the person *will* have the rights of president, and we take measures to protect their lives (we actually go a step further, as even presidential candidates get special treatment). We even protect *past* presidents because of the office they once held. We *also* protect the rights of pre-moral reasoners (aka children) before they can be exercised, limiting parents’ abilities to abrogate their children’s future choices.

       I think the usage of “rights” here is probably also problematic, but I can’t put my finger on it exactly. There seems to be some overlap between “that which an individual is entitled to possess” (e.g. life) and “that which an individual is entitled to do” (e.g. write a prescription). MacIntyre would probably say that even accepting “human rights” as generally held is giving away the game on its own, but at least we can be consistent.

       As for the issue of a difference in the amount of time for a fetus to become conscious vs the time for a sleeper to become conscious, that’s a matter of degree. If we’re going to go that route, we might as well just go full Hume, with all the concomitant horrors.

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    4. Thanks for your reactions and questions here. I’ll say that it seems like your Coma case is potentially difficult: one thing that we might want to know about is what kind of psychological connections (e.g., memories, relations) you would retain to your “prior self” so to speak. Would there be many, or would it almost seem like there is a new person there?

       About Question 2, I’d suggest you read the book’s sections on “question-begging arguments” and the discussion of Thomson and the right to life, which address the concern you raise.

       Thanks!

    5. “Thanks for this suggestion about appealing to “potential.””

       If there is an honest disagreement between choicers and lifers (presuming both to have some genuine concern for morality), then perhaps is it the different values given to the past, present and future. The lifer will say that killing a fetus is destroying the future — the potential — of that little person. The choicer will respond that that little person has no past (which would have value and therefore should be conserved) and therefore that little person is not a person. The utterly narcissistic radfem will say that the only thing that could possibly matter is wiminzrites to do whatever they want — only the present matters.

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13. While it may be getting into the area of “sophistry”, PR and manipulative persuasion you reject, I have often been frustrated when my attempts to convince pro-choice (or pro Planned Parenthood more specifically) to modify their arguments are rebuffed (often with liberal use of ad-hominens and vitriol). I am firmly pro-choice, and wish to help further this cause. However I am dismayed by the rhetoric of some on this side, I feel it is often, at best, unpersuasive to what ought to be the target audience, or at worst actually counterproductive to the cause.

    One issue that has come up a few times is anti-abortion activist’s opposition to government funding of PP clinics *at all* (as we know, in USA federal government money cannot be used to pay direct costs for abortion procedures, doctors fees, surgical trays, anesthesia etc,. But it can pay for other women’s health care, and the general operating costs of the clinic). Many PP boosters loudly deride opposing federal funds to PP as stupid, since it doesn’t pay for abortions directly. But, I have argued with them, it does support keeping the clinic open. Follow the logic of someone who is against abortion: they want abortions to be less easily available. Abortion being easily available depends on the clinics staying open. If the federal dollars are withdrawn, some of the clinics will close. Abortion will be less available. Makes perfect sense. Again, i am not arguing against federal money to PP -I think it should be increased! I am just telling the pro-PP activists that their argument is weak. It’s likely to be unpersuasive to people they should be trying to persuade. I have been met with extreme anger at times for presenting this argument. I have never had anyone concede it’s a logical argument, whether they agree with or not. Most of them seem to not even understand the argument. A fair number of them seem like they are making a deliberate effort to not understand it. They usually respond with the same old tired soundbites.

    I had a similar exchange regarding a high production value image PSA PP put out a couple of years ago. It featured a young Latina woman, early 20s. She explained she was bisexual, and had a very active sex life, with many partners both short and long term. She was currently in post grad at university, on a sholarship studying Art History. It was explained that we need to fund PP so she can continue to receive frequent STD tests and other checkups, because it is important that this beautiful young women remain free to continue her prolific and libertine sexual lifestyle.

    While I agree on funding PP for her needs, and actually really, really wish I could emulate or participate in her lifestyle, I argued that this PSA is not likely to resonate well with a lot of viewers. Let’s assume the target audience is people who are “on the fence” about PP funding. People who are very liberal already support it strongly, so they aren’t a target audience. That target is likely to be somewhat conservative to moderate, working class. Not people who have the ability to participate in the kind of lifestyle this gorgeous young woman does, even if they wanted (or allowed themselves) to. They are likely to be, if not strongly religious, at least a bit oriented towards conservative sexual morality (prudish). The depiction of this fortunate young woman is likely to inspire envy, even resentment. Then when they are told they need to direct more of their tax dollars to supporting her sexual adventures, resentment turns to resentment.

    About 15 people responded. Half of them were vile insults aimed at me. The rest were variations of “you don’t know what you are talking about”, “it’s not your place to say”, or “people don’t actually think like that.

    These people often are truly living in an echo chamber. Articles like this are sorely needed.

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    1. Thank you for these observations, which are interesting, important and troubling!

14. The claim that making a point becomes too hard to understand when the argument is limited to a short amount of time or written with a minimal amount of verbiage is bullcrap.
    How long did it take for you to understand the meaning of bullcrap? One word, eight letters and a point made that anyone can understand.

    The claim presented in the very first paragraph of this piece is bullcrap. Pro choice arguments are NOT harder to make than pro life arguments.

    As soon as I read that, I stopped reading.

    IF the pro choice argument is harder to make than the pro life argument it’s not due to the length of the time allotted or amount of space allowed to make the argument, but instead it’s a matter that most sound minded people understand that misrepresenting or erroneously identifying something, anything, usually results in a non starter when it comes to showing interest in the argument.

    For example, Making the argument that infanticide for the purpose of self satisfaction is actually just a “women’s right to choose,” is as full of bullcrap as putting forth the argument that rape is actually just a “social event”.

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    1. Thanks for this reaction. I am reading you as saying that “bullcrap’ arguments usually will and should be recognized as such. While I hope that’s so, that leaves it an open question how any non-bullcrap arguments will be engaged with. Thanks.