Vox’s Double Standard For Hate

What rules govern the social acceptability of interactions between people that invoke immutable (race, gender etc.) or quasi-immutable (religion, class etc.) characteristics? How do these rules relate to serious expressions of potentially divisive opinions and which of them can be bent or broken in the name of comedy?

These are the questions I have been asking myself following the recent controversy surrounding conservative comedian Steven Crowder and Vox contributor Carlos Maza. Maza has a YouTube series called Strikethrough, on Vox’s channel, where he discusses the problems with conservatism and conservative media like Fox News. Crowder has his own YouTube channel, on which he discusses conservative talking points with a dash of comedic flair. He has also made a number of videos debunking Maza’s, in which he makes jabs at Maza’s sexuality and ethnicity, calling him a “lispy sprite,” “gay Mexican” (Maza is Cuban), “gay Latino from Vox” and an “an angry little queer.” This has resulted in a backlash against YouTube from the Left and a backlash against the backlash from the Right.

In any serious discussion, I imagine such jabs would be out of place—even for satire, they may cross the line. But the rules surrounding the social acceptability of interactions between people are unclear. A look into past Vox publications illustrates this confusion.

Vox has published not one, not two, but three separate articles defending racist tweets made by Sarah Jeong, including: “Oh man it’s kind of sick how much joy I get out of being cruel to old white men”; “White people marking up the internet with their opinions like dogs pissing on fire hydrants” and “#CancelWhitePeople.” Vox has described the outrage generated by Jeong’s tweets as “a bullying tactic of the alt-right” and defended Jeong’s statements as “the expressive way anti-racists and minorities talk about white people.” Vox’s founder, Ezra Klein, has compared Jeong’s tweets to the feminist Twitter hashtag #KillAllMen:

They didn’t want me put to death. They didn’t want any men put to death. They didn’t hate me, and they didn’t hate men. “#KillAllMen” was another way of saying “it would be nice if the world sucked less for women.” It was an expression of frustration with pervasive sexism … The same dynamic seems to me to be at play in the way “white people” is used in Jeong’s jokes. On social justice Twitter, the term means something closer to “the dominant power structure and culture” than it does to actual white people.

Klein thinks these expressions are reasonable expressions of frustration with dominant power structures and that there is no genuine hatred in the hearts of their users. Klein’s colleague Zack Beauchamp also argues that “(given the 280-character limit [on Twitter]) it’s a lot easier to use the kind of ‘white people’ shorthand rather than adding endless qualifications (‘a certain kind of white person, definitely Not All White People’ is pretty lengthy).”

I agree that, when feminists use #KillAllMen or when self-professed anti-racists use hashtags like #CancelWhitePeople, it is highly unlikely that these people actually want to kill members of these groups. But that is not where I would draw the line of acceptability. I care whether people harbor hatred—and I believe the purveyors of such messages do.

Blanket condemnation of groups are not unique to the Left, of course. Wildly popular conservative pundit Ben Shapiro once wrote that “Israelis like to build. Arabs like to bomb crap and live in open sewage.” Donald Trump once said of Mexican immigrants, “They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.” Should Ezra Klein’s arguments apply to these statements, too? After all, Trump openly states that he is not talking about all Mexican immigrants and Shapiro has claimed that he did not mean all Arabs. Are either or both of these people hateful? Can we judge by a hyper-narrow focus on one instance, ignoring their larger body of work?

One problem with Zack Beauchamp’s shorthand defence is that the language used in such cases is consistent, even in media without a character limit, such as magazine articles, YouTube videos, etc. The language used in these jokes matches that used by people expressing serious, non-satirical criticisms of whites, men, immigrants, Arabs, Muslims, Christians, etc. Repeated broad-brush criticisms of groups—even in the face of pushback—suggest underlying prejudice.

Richard Spencer, de facto leader of the alt-right, has written, “For us ‘immigration’ is a proxy for race … I do think we have a psychic connection, or you can say a deeper connection, with Donald Trump in a way that we simply do not have with most Republicans.” Jared Taylor, another prominent alt-right leader, has described the immigration situation on America’s southern border as an invasion—just as Donald Trump has. When people see the same phrases used in similar contexts by the president and by alt-right figureheads, they may reasonably conclude that Trump has some core similarities with the white nationalists. Personally, I do not think he is a white nationalist—but I think he shares many of the same hateful feelings.

In 2017, the New York Times ran an editorial entitled “Can My Children Be Friends With White People?,” in which the author writes, “I will teach my boys to have profound doubts that friendship with white people is possible.” In the same year, a Texas student newspaper posted an article entitled “Your DNA is an Abomination,” with a banner image reading White Is Over. It is hard to see how the term white in these examples can be merely shorthand for a certain kind of white person.

When Donald Trump posits that “some [Mexican immigrants], I assume, are good people,” this is a major red flag. Here, Trump pre-emptively uses the Beauchamp defence that he doesn’t mean all Mexicans. But should we really buy into this? If so, should we apply it unilaterally or bilaterally?

What, then, are the rules that should govern social interactions? They should, surely, include these: do not denigrate another human being for their immutable or quasi-immutable characteristics; do not hold the actions of individual members of a group defined by such characteristics as representative of said group. There is no moral difference between painting Muslims as evil and painting whites as evil. Particularly egregious or repeated offences against these moral norms should, I would argue, warrant social opprobrium.

But how do these rules change in a satirical setting? Jokes should not be interpreted literally, but a satirical manner does not absolve you of the responsibility not to say abhorrently prejudiced things. It is often difficult, of course, to differentiate between humour and bigotry. But one can identify some jokes that clearly cross that line and attempt to create a set of neutral principles on that basis.

Many of those who cast Crowder as a deplorable would probably not bat an eyelid at a joke about a Southern drawl, an incest joke about an Alabaman, a paedophilia joke about a priest, or a short man joke about a political opponent, such as Ben Shapiro.  This suggests that they base their moral framework on collectivist principles, viewing society as made up of groups of oppressors and oppressed, endlessly vying for power.

Zack Beauchamp has argued:

What makes these quasi-satirical generalizations about “white people” different from actual racism is, yes, the underlying power structure in American society. There is no sense of threat associated with Jeong making a joke about how white people have dog-like opinions. But when white people have said the same about minorities, it has historically been a pretext for violence or justification for exclusionary politics.

From a left-wing perspective, Crowder’s jokes are unacceptable hate speech because, historically, people who share the same characteristics as Crowder (straight, white and male) have used their social and political power to oppress people like Maza (gay and Hispanic)—and some still do. There is therefore an implicit threat when Crowder makes a joke about Maza. The same implicit threat would not exist if Maza were to make a joke about Crowder’s masculinity, straightness or ethnicity.

Ironically, however, this rule set creates its own system of power that allows for a double standard, by which people from minorities can abuse those from the majority with impunity. Some of the largest media organizations in the world, such as the New York TimesWashington Post and Vox, not only categorically reject that Jeong’s statements—and those like Jeong’s—are hateful, but actively espouse similar views, while expressing full condemnation of Crowder’s remarks.  When the Crowders of the world are demonetized or lose their jobs or platforms, while the Jeongs not only keep theirs, but are praised for their utterances, arguably, the Jeongs are more powerful. But, in any case, is a perceived power differential really the appropriate standard by which to evaluate the morality or acceptability of interactions between people? Shouldn’t we all be judged as individuals?

Any statement which casts aspersions on a human being on the basis of an immutable characteristic is morally wrong. It is also wrong to hold all members of a group responsible for actions committed by a single member, with whom they may have nothing in common beyond skin colour or genitalia. Too many on the Left allow members of traditionally marginalized groups impunity to express bigoted views under the guise of Social Justice. It’s time reasonable people stopped condoning this.

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15 comments

  1. “I care whether people harbor hatred”

    But everyone harbors hatred. Everyone has a list of people and organizations and things that they hate, and some hates are even compulsory (Nazis, child molesters, etc.) We are entitled to our hates (I hate the Serbs and the Hutus, both for reasons that aren’t hard to guess.) The problem with trying to banish hate is not just that some hates are compulsory, but that it involves mind reading. For example, if I am critical of Israel naturally the predictable people will say that I hate the Jews. Firstly that’s wrong, but secondly it is irrelevant. Maybe I do hate the Jews, or maybe I am one and consider what Israel is doing to be beneath us. It doesn’t matter if I hate them or love them, what matters is that I can defend what I say about them. We shouldn’t try to read people’s hearts as to their hatreds, it’s private. We should rather critique their arguments.

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  2. The central premise this article rests upon is completely unfounded; Carlos Maza is not Vox. I’m surprised at this really obvious equivocation between the two. I mean, come on, Vox employees (including Maza) are currently striking in a protest *against Vox.* I’m surprised that a “right/libertarian” would so readily jump to associate an individual as interchangeable with a group they’re associated with…

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    1. The article is much less about Vox than the underlying ideas. That being said, Vox has condemned Crowder’s remarks about Maza, which is hypocritical given its defense of Jeong.

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  3. (This is another reply to Kevin’s latest reply; my browser seems to have a problem with direct replies.)

    Thank you for the response and the clarifications, Kevin. Some clarifications on my part:

    I don’t have perfect information about people. I don’t know what they would or wouldn’t do in various potential situations. Given that future technology like AGI and forced artificial longevity may allow the implementation of fates much worse than death, I have to ask the question, who, if anyone, would like to force a fate much worse than death on my person? And of course one way to answer this question is to look at people’s norms and statements of intent. People who disavow all torture are less likely to force a hellish fate on me than people who have a long tradition of glorifying hell as justice – a tradition that continues to the present day. People who openly tell me that they think God is the center of morality, and Hell is a form of deserved, proportionate justice in the eyes of their God are far more likely to implement hellish dystopias, if they are technologically on the table, than people who firmly reject such methods.

    There is also the political reality that many Islam-dominated political systems are massively repressive against dissent and use torture methods condoned in their holy texts in present day. Just look at Saudi-Barbaria, Iran or ISIS. I recognize the diversity of Islam-dominated political systems, but I also see a correlation. Yes, not only Muslims do this, but it’s a pattern, and they justify it with their religious texts.

    Given that we have incomplete knowledge about what people will do if they gain the power to force their will, I take this as Bayesian evidence that we cannot trust their intent, considering how many credible signals of untrustworthiness they have sent our way, often without any subtlety. Yes, this is stochastical discrimination and it allows for more precision when we judge individuals, if we have more precise information about them. But sometimes stochastical discrimination is still a useful tool, in absence of better tools.

    The least we can say about Muslims, Christians and Maoists/Stalinists is that they have chosen to remain affiliated with an identity that has historically both glorified and implemented severe human rights abuses. That alone says something about the trustworthiness of a person in case they gain the power to harm us.

  4. Grumpy Bear,

    Yes, you are right he was talking about Illegal Immigrants from Mexico specifically, but this does not absolve him of what he said here. When he says “some, I assume are good people” he is implicitly stating many are not good people. This wording in particular, along with the rapists and murderers comments just before, conveys the message that more are bad people than good. Its a huge broadbrush statement, no different than many of the left’s broadbrush statements about whites.

    There are appropriate ways to talk about the serious issue of illegal immigration from the southern border. Painting these illegal immigrants as bad people in the manner Trump did runs counter to the individualist moral framework that conservatism is built upon.

    I don’t particularly care for scrutinizing one statement from an individual to assassinate their character, but much of Trumps previous statements on this issue and similar issues resonates quite closely with this statement. There is little, if any, work of his that indicates he feels differently than what he said in this instance.

    Contrast that with someone like Ben Shapiro who has his own history of over generalizations but whose entire body of work actively combats identity politics and racism (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2rgNLvzDYTs) and you get a much different picture of who they are on the inside.

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    1. Kevin, it is not an unreasonable generalisation to cast illegal immigrants as largely bad people. This would be like saying car jackers or drug dealers are disproportionately bad people: it is not based on any immutable characteristic, but rather their own conduct. People who break the law tend to be worse people than those that don’t.

      The evidence you’re (possibly not) looking for that Trump doesn’t really have a problem with immigrants or Hispanics is that his administration has substantially increased the number of H1N visas.

  5. My 2¢: the sting of asymmetrical power relations doesn’t exempt anyone—no matter how oppressed—from clear thinking; nothing done in the past, or done in the present, can exempt anyone—no matter how wronged—from intellectual honesty; cultural relativity is descriptive, not prescriptive (it helps one better understand and contextualize, not justify, cultural practices; e.g., no left-leaning “relativist” would ever dare to justify the Jim Crow-era tradition of lynching – the postmodernists are wrong, dead wrong); and whataboutery is the go-to fallacy of both the analytically naive and the ethically despicable, Left and Right alike. If those of good faith don’t critique and correct the unclear thinking, intellectual dishonesty, prescriptivist use of cultural relatively, and knee-jerk use of whataboutery flooding one’s own side’s discourse (to keep the deluge metaphor going, both Trumpism and Woke-ism are the discursive equivalents of water toxemia), then “winning” arguments—to say nothing of elections—won’t matter, since everyone will have already lost, more than their minds.

  6. “When Donald Trump posits that “some [Mexican immigrants], I assume, are good people,” this is a major red flag. Here, Trump pre-emptively uses the Beauchamp defence that he doesn’t mean all Mexicans.”

    Author is somehow confusing illegal immigrants with Mexican citizens or American citizens of Mexican descent.

    Being an illegal immigrant is neither a immutable nor quasi-immutable characteristic. It is a result of a deliberate and conscious decision to break the law.

  7. I didn’t say it doesn’t apply to other belief systems like Christianity or, say, Maoism. Neither did I throw large swaths of people under the umbrella of the bad idea – who many actual Muslims believe that non-Muslims ought to be tortured in Hell as a just punishment? That number isn’t small, I’m sure, and I didn’t cause that – they did.

    As for the definition of Muslim and Islam, to me, a Muslim is a person who believes in Islam. Not sure how that distinction is saving your case.

    1. Andaro,

      But you did throw large swaths of people under the umbrella of the bad idea, presumably by mistake. The quote you cited was

      “There is no moral difference between painting Muslims as evil and painting whites as evil.”

      Calling Muslims evil, or implying they’re evil is wrong.

      There are certainly evil ideas in Islamic holy texts, as someone like Sam Harris points out quite often. I’m perfectly fine with calling these ideas for what they are, but many millions of Muslims do not hold these extreme views, even if they are apart of their religion. Just like many Christians/Jews don’t believe Atheists should be put to death even though you can find passages in the old testament that explicitly call for their deaths. Just because the bad ideas are apart of their religion does not mean that everyone who subscribes to the religion subscribes to the bad ideas.

      I have no problem with those who criticize the faiths themselves. I do it all the time. I have a huge problem with those who make character judgements about individuals who do believe in those faiths.

      Another issue that comes up from your reply is whether or not all people who believe in bad ideas are necessarily bad themselves. To me, the answer to this is clear, someone can certainly believe in immoral ideas and not be a bad person. Not everyone who has said or done something racist is a bad person. What is considered racist is highly subjective and dependent on a person’s underlying moral principals. There are very good people on both sides of the abortion debate, but they approach the difficult philosophical question from very different moral perspectives. I’m not saying we can’t try and make objective claims about which moral perspective is correct, just that being on the wrong side doesn’t necessitate that the person is “bad”.

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  8. For me the whole issue revolves around the erroneous teaching of the importance of having a positive “personal self image.”
    Self image, a Satanic mantra that says feelings are what really determines what’s important.
    Feelings have collided with and demonized facts and truth.
    The fact is my feelings and your feelings are worth as much as a bucket of warm spit to anyone who isn’t a close relative or friend and feelings are of so little importance as to not even be mentioned as protected by constitutional rights.
    If what I just wrote has hurt anyone’s feelings I offer no apology and encourage other offenders of feelings to do likewise.

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  9. “There is no moral difference between painting Muslims as evil and painting whites as evil.”

    Sure there is. Race may be a set of genetic characteristics, but religion is a set of beliefs, including norms of behavior. And those can very much be evil.

    Of course, not all ideas connected with Islam are evil. But some of them are: E.g. that non-believers should be tortured in Hell without consent and without the right to even die. I think we very much have the right to judge those who actually believe this, not just as a supernatural assumption, but as an actual moral norm how to treat non-believers.

    Also, unlike skin pigmentation, religious beliefs are not an immutable characteristic. They may not always be freely chosen – they rely too much on biography for that – but they are mutably by the intelligent will of the person.

    1. Andaro, Muslim is not a religion, Islam is. Many Muslims who believe in Islam reject violence in the name of the faith. You could just as easily pick verses from the bible to denigrate all Christians and it would be just as wrong. I am all for harsh criticism of bad or evil ideas but trying to throw large swaths of people under the umbrella of the bad idea is just wrong. This is what the modern political left does with “Whiteness” and it’s wrong for the same reasons. Judging people as individuals is the ideal.

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      1. And yet, in your article, you implicitly judge Maza as complicit and obeisant with his employer because of his identity as an employee. All it takes to completely unsea the premise of your article is to pose the notion that Maza, as an individual, might disagree with Vox doing these things. Just because he works for them doesn’t mean he endorses their other videos, and just because they employ him doesn’t mean they support his positions on Crowder, YouTube ToS, or platforming. This is such an astonishingly simple distinction that it’s genuinely puzzling how anyone could miss it, let alone someone who prides themselves on “judging people as individuals.”

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