Jordan Peterson: Philosophically Unorthodox, Psychologically Heterodox, Fundamentally Uncontroversial

It seems that in order to discuss Canadian psychology professor Jordan Peterson at all, a person must declare her loyalties right away, pronouncing him either a messiah or a devil. The primary problem with this is that all of the nuance of a realistic, considered look at his ideas lies outside of declarations of political fealty or ideological loyalties and speculations as to his presumed intent. There is much in what Peterson actually thinks, writes and says to criticize. The primary obstacle to this is not necessarily Peterson’s ideas themselves, but the polarization which prevents any sincere intellectual dissection of them. The discourse around Peterson has rendered what he actually thinks unclear to almost everyone. This problem is exacerbated both by Peterson’s own convoluted rhetorical style, which is digressive and esoteric, and the inaccurate, caricatured reports of his views, which are almost as ubiquitous in the media as Peterson himself. He is frequently woefully misinterpreted, while legitimate criticisms go unmade. All of this fuels polarization.

When Peterson visited Dublin last July, I had the opportunity to sit down with him for an hour for an interview which later ran in the Irish Times. We discussed the philosophical grounding of his ideas in detail. These are both more coherent and benevolent than Peterson is generally given credit for, and less philosophically straightforward or easily defensible than his fans might like. In order to look carefully at what Peterson thinks and where his ideas originate, we must wade into philosophy and psychology, because Peterson bases his ideas about how we think and function at the intersection between these two disciplines.

Three things became clear from our conversation. First, Peterson’s perspective is based on well documented ideas within the history of psychology, but is unorthodox in the context of modern psychology. That unorthodoxy is not straightforward, because it rests upon the same widely accepted philosophical maxims that modern orthodox psychological theory and approaches grew out of, but which their practitioners are not necessarily well versed in. Secondly, Peterson’s philosophy is untidy, and contains inherent problems, though not necessarily worse problems than those that anyone who tackles big issues like mind, consciousness and the nature of reality will run into. His training as a clinical psychologist does not mesh comfortably with his habit of appealing to the metaphysical for overarching explanations, and makes him an outlier within what has become known as the Intellectual Dark Web. Finally, I realized that 12 Rules for Life, his bestselling book, is not deserving of the controversy it has generated. It is a solid self-help book. The rules themselves can be found in many other self-help texts, all the way back to the first ever written: Samuel Smiles’ Self Help, a Victorian bestseller published in 1859.


Peterson’s notion of truth is his biggest problem, because it is fundamental to his perspective on everything else. Even after conversing carefully with him about it and giving it significant thought since our conversation last summer, I am still not completely clear on it, and I am not alone in that—the topic was the source of the remarkable confusion and miscommunication between Sam Harris and Peterson during Peterson’s first appearance on Harris’ Waking Up podcast. However, it is clear that Peterson’s conception of truth is modeled in part on William James’ pragmatic theory of truth, which suggests that the truth or meaning of a statement should be considered in relation to its practical consequences.

The primary problem with Peterson’s theory is attaching it to a concept of truth at all: doing so pitches him into a sort of relativism about truth, which erodes the concept of truth it relies upon. This position forces Peterson to prioritize certain interpretations of reality based on their predicted or observed consequences rather than how factual they are, which brings him within sniffing distance of the postmodernists he finds so unreasoned, who prioritize narratives that describe the world on the basis of interpreted meaning rather than truth. Obviously, this creates philosophical and practical problems, the most basic being that relative truth is not truth. It is a self-defeating appeal to a concept of truth, which maintains that nothing is objectively true apart from the statement that nothing is objectively true. Such theories fly in the face of an objective or scientific approach. It is difficult to appeal to facts when what constitutes a fact can shift according to the interpretative narrative in play.

In Peterson’s defense, his perspective makes more logical sense than it may at first appear to and arises from a certain humility about what we can know. While he doesn’t appear to posit that only minds exist, Peterson does understand that reality is mediated through minds. When I touch the bark of a tree, it is very difficult to distinguish information about the tree from information about my hand, and I cannot really know whether the view through the eyes of a cat is a truer representation of, say, my living room, than the one being processed by my own eyes. Psychology is interested in brains, not minds, but Peterson maintains that brains and minds are not the same thing. He correctly asserts that there is much about the brain or mind—the thing that mediates between us and the world—that we don’t understand. We think that we have knowledge of the external world, but we might be wrong—and, in fact, are often proved so.

The difference between Peterson and, say, Judith Butler, the famous philosopher and gender theorist, who argues that gender is socially constructed through performative speech and behaviors, is narrower than might first appear, but still distinct. Both understand us to live in a world in which our interpretation of reality might very well be wrong. Both are ultimately skeptical about the concept of an objective truth unmediated by human experience. In response to this skepticism, Butler throws everything out, both baby and bathwater, but Peterson suggests that if we can’t hold fast to objective truths, we can utilize pragmatic ones. This is, to some extent, abductive logic: a statement is an apt truth statement if it is pragmatically useful. This might be the case in mathematics, and in its usefulness as a basis for fields like physics, engineering, chemistry, and so on, which we use to better understand and live in the world. This position is not without significant issues, however. Figuring out where to draw the line, and whether there can be any truths at all, who gets to decide whether this is the case and what those truths might be, has an element of arbitrariness to it. In this sense, it is what philosophers call a wicked problem: one that is extremely difficult or perhaps impossible to solve because of incomplete or contradictory information or knowledge, a changing landscape or the relationship of the problem to other problems.

Peterson’s suggested solution to the problem around truth is to reinstate a Judeo-Christian narrative to explain and orient our lives. Why the Judeo-Christian cultural and ethical narrative over other narratives, you might reasonably ask? I asked Peterson whether what he is suggesting is a Christian version of cultural Judaism—in other words, Christianity without the religious observance and practice, which might potentially function as a sort of holistic framework. His aim, he told me, is to put the Judeo-Christian substructure back underneath our culture. He argues that what separates this from the ideologies he opposes so stridently (like those advocated by fans of Judith Butler) is the fact that ideologies do not provide a full narrative, but religious structures do. There are many potential problems with this.

Douglas Murray pointed out one of them when he suggested that this is where the Jesus smuggling comes in, in a phrase he attributes to Eric Weinstein. Murray suggests that you can follow along with what Peterson is saying in relation to archetypes and Christian imagery, and you may even feel that it is just a narrative device to elucidate his ideas, but at the back of your mind, there is a part of you waiting for Jesus to be smuggled in through a side door, and for you to be listening in actuality to a religious argument. This feeling is understandable. However, we run into another confusion here, because Peterson does not appear to be advocating any sort of theocratic structure or social body which compels compliance.

He did, in an interview last summer, suggest that monogamy should be socially enforced through norms, such that non-monogamy should be socially disapproved of. He suggested that this would act as a disincentive, in the same way that such forces currently discourage most of us from, for example, defecating outside of a bathroom. This is a controversial view, and will be met with general unpopularity, but those who argue that such views make him a fascist are self-evidently incorrect. He is not advocating harm, or state compulsion, or any form of forcible compliance. Peterson is in the business of encouraging what he sees as ethical norms and values, not compelled speech and action, which he opposed, for example, in the case of Canada’s Bill C-16, his resistance to which brought him to global awareness. Socially enforced norms already operate within every society: he is merely advocating their application to an area to which many people would strongly argue they don’t belong. Depending on your outlook, this may be distasteful, but it is not necessarily coercive—indeed since we’re dealing with something that isn’t about facts, norms and values are all we can appeal to in order to decide how best to live. Since, Peterson says, we can’t create norms and values from nothing, they have to be located inside a larger explanatory theory.

Where Philosophy Meets Psychology

One of the key debates in the philosophy of mind and psychology looks at whether minds are different entities from brains, and whether a non-physical entity, like consciousness, can be a by-product of a physical one, like a brain.  Most psychologists avoid this tangle and focus entirely on brains. When I asked him about this, Peterson acknowledged that he is a dualist. In the context of psychology, this dualism essentially means that Peterson does not consider consciousness to be something that arises from brain processes, or more simply put, he does not equate the mind with the brain. Peterson’s rejection of an almost wholly monistic modern psychological discipline, which takes brains and minds to be equivalent or essentially related entities, makes him a heterodox psychologist. This may seem like a lofty and impractical point without pragmatic relevance, but it is the essential element that sets Peterson apart from his contemporaries in the field of psychology and excludes him from the logical positivism that characterizes other figures within the intellectual dark web, such as Sam Harris, who focus on the empirical and material world.

However, it does not necessarily make Peterson unusual within the history of psychological ideas: he is simply out of step with the historical direction that those ideas have taken. He would be well placed as a pre-twentieth-century psychological theorist, but that is not to say that he is old fashioned or unaware of what others are doing. Those familiar with the genesis of early psychology as it branched away from philosophy into a separate discipline will recognize in Peterson’s speech and writing echoes of foundational psychological figures like William James, Freud and Jung. They will also recognize the hallmarks and theories of philosophers whom those three and others drew from (or in Freud’s case, directly lifted from without attribution): Nietzsche, Kant and, to a less widely recognized extent, Spinoza. William James, in particular, is still associated with an unclear and mildly vertiginous style of prose, which has led to fundamental misunderstandings of his most widely known theory: of emotion.

The point is this—Peterson’s slightly rhetorical, dense and image-rich style of expression is not at all out of place within the period of psychology which most appears to influence him and about which he is undoubtedly very well informed. It does, however, contrast heavily with modern approaches, which themselves are still rooted in, but not necessarily analytical about, the sort of fundamental early psychological ideas that Peterson loves best. Critics who describe his ideas as fraudulent, pseudo-philosophical or not real psychology are overlooking the philosophical origins of fundamental psychological concepts. Whether or not the philosophical foundation that underpins Peterson’s ideas is robust enough to do all of the necessary work is another question (I have my doubts). Nevertheless, he did not produce it from nothing, and while he may not be orthodox, that is not in itself a justification for dismissing his ideas.

However, these original figures in psychology were not—by any really respectable definition of the word—scientists. They blended philosophy and empiricism to create a hybrid discipline, but it was flawed, conceptually untidy and inconsistent, and, in some respects, philosophically sloppy. This is the tradition from which Peterson emerges. It is no longer fashionable within the field of psychology for these reasons and others, but it is not wholly without valuable content either. Problems arise for Peterson when he attempts to blend these ideas with his undoubtedly robust empirical training as a psychologist. The fit is not always a comfortable one.

Combine Peterson’s decidedly difficult and confusing concept of truth with the nascent philosophy of psychology that characterizes psychology’s early period, from Wilhelm Wundt to Freud and Jung, and the meandering lyrical writing style of key figures from that period, and there is plenty of room for confusion and misinterpretation. To be fair to Peterson, describing concepts like mind or consciousness, which are inherently metaphysical, necessitates language which is to an extent nebulous or incorporeal. Peterson’s rhetorical, occasionally purple, prose is not out of keeping with the writings of people like Freud or Jung. The problem is that Freudian holistic psychoanalysis is not taken seriously within psychology anymore, and, while Peterson regards Jung’s conceptually demanding and implacably difficult writings as close to revealed wisdom, others see them as purposefully opaque, and as stretching the bounds of rational discourse and understanding to the point, for the some of the work at least, of little more than fantastical hypothesis.


The unusual philosophical orientation of Jordan Peterson’s ideas, and the confusion and bad press that arise from this, extend to the public reception of everything he does. This includes his bestselling self-help book, 12 Rules For Life, which is surely a candidate for the most uncontroversial controversial book ever written, in terms of its psychology. If you look at any self-help book, you will find most or all of Peterson’s twelve rules inside. This is old wisdom repackaged for the modern age.

The book certainly attempts to bridge an ambitious and not entirely successful philosophy with the practical maxims it advocates. However, the idea that the rules themselves are in some way malevolent or a bad influence is frankly laughable, given maxims as benign and constructive as treat yourself like someone you are responsible for helping and tell the truth—or at least, don’t lie. One wonders whether, if such advice were attached to a name other than Peterson’s, it would garner any controversy at all. Even the rules that Peterson is most roundly criticized for are benign. I have heard the rule set your house in perfect order before you criticize the world described as insidious, because it encourages structurally oppressed people to turn their focus away from their oppressors and to suffer within the boundaries imposed on them. If this is the case, then every therapeutic approach within psychology is harmful, since they all encourage us to focus on what we have control over rather than what we don’t, and to concentrate on constructive personal responsibility, rather than on resentment of even legitimate wrongs committed against us. Psychologically, Peterson is advising people to do what Stoic philosophers suggested—take charge of what you can control, and try not to obsess about what you cannot. Control your emotions (or rather don’t let them get out of control). Don’t blame others for problems you can fix yourself, and be an independent individual, who can contribute to society. None of this necessarily denies the real role of structural and systemic obstacles to individual progress in the world.

12 Rules for Life is helpful and informative in pragmatic terms, even if you excise the somewhat prolix philosophical chunks. Peterson uses his metaphysical ideas to justify why these rules are worth following, but they have value without them. The rules are as empowering and motivational as those in any self-help book that tells people that they have the power to tackle their own problems. Peterson is neither a generational prodigy, as touchy superfans insist, nor is he a danger to women, minorities or our liberal way of life. A person with a track record of resisting and rejecting state compulsion both in principle and in action, and who willingly accedes that there are dispossessed people for whom the left has a moral obligation to speak, cannot also be a far-right ideologue who wants to trap women in the kitchen and force theocracy on us all.


Perceptions of Peterson are inflated—both those which vilify and those which praise him. In reality, he is a heterodox academic, who is not interested in collective identity, except insofar as it might be criticized. Arguably, this is precisely how a psychologist, whose medium is the individual mind or brain, should think. Epistemologically, he is on a different grounding from most of his academic and clinical colleagues. This makes him unusual in psychology, but not necessarily wrong. He is not a Nazi or a fascist or alt right. He simply isn’t an ally, which, to many, makes him equivalent to one or all three of the former. The reality of what Peterson thinks is nuanced, complicated, inconsistent and not entirely satisfying. Heterodox thinkers don’t usually thrive within the academy, but Peterson is, unusually, thriving outside of it. Jealousy of this success is what partly motivates the intense academic and media loathing of him—that and his opaque style, slightly stuffy manner, tendency to come across as arrogant (like so many academics) and willingness to wade without apparent emotion into territories that are explosive in the current political climate. Peterson’s ideas merit criticism, but this criticism should be focused upon ideas he actually holds, rather than on those foisted upon him.

It has become fashionable to mock Peterson by making fun of his suits, his hair or his diet, listing those who disagree with him and implying that he is a bigot. He has become an individual whom we can dismiss without serious engagement or effort. This is wrong. We should not dismiss anyone without serious engagement and effort, and even then it should be their ideas and not their personhood that we reject. Here is a controversial statement: Jordan Peterson’s ideas, on close examination, are not all that controversial.

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  1. Thank you, that was a fine article.
    One aspect of Peterson’s Truth that is worth mentioning is that it is an attempt at bridging the domains of Science (facts) and the Humanities/religion (Values). Peterson’s Pragmatic theory of Truth encompasses both domains within a single hierarchy without making either subservient to the other. He hasn’t really developed this line of thought (at least not publicly) but that’s a lofty goal to aim at.

    Why does this matter? Because putting values above science fails terribly when reality refuses to conform to your value system (religion, post-modernism, etc). And putting science above values risks leaving us in a mechanical world without purpose or morality.

  2. Laura Kennedy, is a gifted writer and I enjoyed reading her seemingly “hit the nail on the head” perceptions about Peterson.

    I’m not a fan of Peterson—or any fallible human being—and find particular fault in his holding onto well-known patriarchal concepts which is his only controversial dilemma and makes him a kind of walking contradiction.

    This article and subsequent commentary do well to inform that it’s not Peterson who is controversial inasmuch as misguided people and believers of religion who don’t know how to live and question everything, who in there need to believe in a god or spirituality, create false prophets from mere human beings like Peterson. The controversy lies in the instant popularity given to people adept like Peterson who know how to repackage and sell commonly known, age old wisdom by making it sound new and innovative again to folks who literally and figuratively buy into it. Unfortunately, there’s not any self-help book written by a spiritual guru or an academic which can completely and successfully be adhered to long term.

    Comment by Tom is how I feel about the writer’s abilities. Well done, Dr. Kennedy!

  3. A good article which crystallises my own thoughts on Peterson.

    I have been quite uneasy with his reliance on Jungian archetypes which have only the most tenuous connection to reality. I have also struggled with why he is so controversial and popolar given his advice is so conventional and traditional.

    The controversy says far more about his opponents and the modern intellectual environment than they do about peterson himself. I think this is also the key to his popularity. Someone in the modern world who argues that the world can be a tough place, for the merits of hard work and self discipline and against the idea that men are intrinsically privileged and abusive stands out. That he refuses to be cowed and keeps his cool under pressure while arguing such moderate and traditional positions is why he has been successful. His philosophy and even psychology are not really relevant except in so far as they give him a Base from which to argue.

    1. ‘uneasy with is reliance on Jungian archetypes’. lol…aren’t we all uneasy about Jungian archetypes.. eh? And yet they don’t seem to go away, no matter how much they are banned as an ‘irrational’ heresy from modern psychology. Are you sure you’ve really understood what is being got at by archetypes? My suspicion is that most of us haven’t – because the full implications of Jung’s original work on them have still been only partially explored. But a fuller understanding of them – as symbolically expressed patterns of experience – are necessary to not be confused and frustrated by Peterson’s notion of ‘truth’.

  4. Jordan Peterson’s ability to amalgamate the best ideas and highest ideals found in existentialist philosophy, Jungian psychology, evolutionary theory, and Christian theology, and especially—for lack of a better way to put it—his Petersonian way of articulating that, has indeed captured the attention of so very many, and very likely many more to come. (Although it’s obvious why the postmodern Left worries so much about Peterson’s popularity, perhaps the traditional Right should worry more?)

  5. “However, it is clear that Peterson’s conception of truth is modeled in part on William James’ pragmatic theory of truth, which suggests that the truth or meaning of a statement should be considered in relation to its practical consequences…………..Obviously, this creates philosophical and practical problems, the most basic being that relative truth is not truth. It is a self-defeating appeal to a concept of truth, which maintains that nothing is objectively true apart from the statement that nothing is objectively true.”

    I very much wish that a PhD in Philosophy would be more careful to avoid logical ambiguity, or the appearance of ambiguity, than this. What does the author mean at this point by “relative truth”, “truth” and “objectively true”? Is this usage predicated on the correspondence theory of “truth” according to which “truth” is a quality inherent in the signification of some words (or other signs) in relation to the “actual” or “real” qualities of the “object” under discussion? Ie: “truth about” the world? Or is “truth” being used as “the Truth” meaning the ontological characteristics of the object under discussion itself?

    In my experience of reading arguments about “truth” people use the word “truth” ambiguously very often. It’s one thing to say that there is no reality which exists apart from my own personal experiences (solipsism) so that my experience is the only “object” about which “truth” may be spoken; another to say that there is but we cannot “know” anything about it in itself but can only know about our own subjective experiences of it and so cannot truthfully say anything about it per se but can only speak truthfully about those subjective experiences; another to say that there is and we can but we may speak untruthfully as well; another to say that there is and we can but since what we say requires to be heard and interpreted by our listeners who have not had the same experiences, then though we may speak truly in our own ears they cannot hear truly in theirs; and yet another to use “truth” as “the Truth” as a synonym for “Reality Itself”; and there are probably other ways of confounding the discussion.

    “relative truth” of the Map to Territory kind, where we all understand that “The Map is not The Territory” but that the map can supply useful information about the territory certainly is “truth”. It is the core semantic meaning of “truth” I submit. Its what a carpenter means when he tells a labourer to “true up” (adjust the corners to 90 degree angles) the forms before pouring the concrete footings for a house. The confusion arises when people are unclear in their references when questioning whether they have been told “the truth”. For example: I might be holding an opaque bag when you ask me “whats in the bag?” and I might reply “The Kohinoor Diamond”, to which you might respond “Is that true?” To what does the “that” refer? Are you focussed on the epistemological qualities of my speech, or on the ontological qualities of the lump in the bag, or both at the same time? If I say “No” are you informed that I have lied, or that the Kohinoor diamond is not in the bag, or both at the same time? And if your consideration hops back and forth from the epistemological fact – I lied – to the ontological fact – whats in the bag is not the Kohinoor diamond – are you keeping the categories epistemological and ontological clearly distinguished in your mind in all the subtle ways in which they need to be distinguished if thought is not to fall into the failure mode of logical ambiguity?

    The statement “relative truth is not truth” should not be baldly stated as a criticism of Peterson’s arguments without first telling us what the author mean by “true” which takes her usage out of the “Map toTerritory” semantics so as to justify that statement; and then showing that Peterson is logically obliged to be using “truth” under her same theory of truth given the exigencies of his argument.

    Peterson is first and foremost a clinical psychologist whose professional experience immersed him the behavioural manifestations of human subjectivity. It is not at all obvious that Scientific Materialism supplies an adequate explanation of human subjective experience: see the writings of David Chalmers on “the hard problem”, and it is perfectly reasonable to suppose that it never will. Nor can Scientific Materialism supply any avenue for deducing values from facts, notwithstanding Sam Harris’s and Ayn Rand’s best efforts to do so, and it is even more reasonable to suppose that it never will. Given the problem of prescribing ways in which living actual people apparently ineluctably suffering subjective personal experiences can live happily together, Peterson’s efforts at a solution are as good as anyones (the zen masters perhaps excepted) and much better than most.

  6. There’s much I disagree with, but my initial introduction to Peterson was via the usual suspects trying to lump him in with Bannon, Milo etc.
    Once I actually listened too him, it was a shock to discover how uncontroversial and mainstream so many of his views actually were. It says more about the parts left that refused to budge from a authoritarian orthodoxy than it says anything about Peterson.
    He still completely loses me once he starts being up God.

    1. yes, the sin of ‘being up on God’. Many a ‘skeptic’ who will happily listen to him debunk the wage gap, or expound on the evils of post modernism, but the moment he strays into THEIR heresy of ‘being up on God’ they suddenly hate him. Usually says more about their own ideological possessions than anything else: That they cannot tolerate him even taking an inch towards a William James pragmatism model. Just like the ideologically fixated radical leftists cannot tolerate him taking a single step towards any kind of ‘biological determinism’.

  7. One of the best articles written on Peterson.”his perspective makes more logical sense than it may at first appear to and arises from a certain humility about what we can know”

  8. All of the ad hominems and shouts of “fascist!” are designed to dismiss Dr. Peterson without serious engagement or effort. That’s the whole *thing*. His ideas are dangerous to the far Left and if allowed to spread unchecked could result in serious damage to their agenda. Already millions of people who had never heard of Dr. Peterson were turned off to his ideas by influential mainstream media publications calling him a fascist. They’ve been inoculated, any mention of him they will disregard.

    If I went into his videos under the presuppositions “this guy is a Nazi, sexist, racist bigot”, as main stream media portrays him I would never have heard a word he said, I would have gone into his videos, skimmed through one trying to find controversial points and then left it at that. Let’s be honest that is the extent of effort put in by the vast majority of his detractors, it’s also while you’ll never really hear legitimate criticism leveled at him, just vague ad-hominem or painfully misinterpreted ideas (especially surrounding his religious interpretations). To reach the point in which you will have a strong enough understanding to criticize, you might find yourself actually pretty enamored with his message, which I’m sure has happened to quite a few individuals but for the vast majority remember, they’re going into it looking for hate and that’s probably all they will be able to take out.

    The goal is quite clearly to make him persona non grata to people who’ve never watched a video of his or read anything he’s written, making him so toxic that they will pigeonhole him (“alt-right bigot”) and never indulge whatever curiosity they might have by going to the source, Peterson. These pieces are not meant to actually inform; they’re meant to block any desire the listener might have to inform him/herself. After all, life is short, we have a finite amount of time here, and why waste it listening to a bigot or a figure beloved by bigots? For example, see this hit piece from the mainstream media:

    He’s definitely not a fascist in any way, shape or form. He does talk ***more*** about the evils of Marxism than fascism, because he assumes people already know fascism is bad. You dont need to talk about how bad fascism is every day, its obvious. But people DO NOT know how bad Marxism is, and it *does* need to be talked about every day.

    They can’t attack his ideas, so they slander the man.

  9. Thank you for being ‘neutral’ and stating personal opinion in English, not in persuasion-propaganda.
    We are entering a time where if privilege must be checked by citizens, then position (slant and agenda) must be cited by every journalist – in every article.
    Thanks for the old-school journalism ethic.

  10. Peterson must be familiar with Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP), which is another unorthodox, non-academic, commercial psychological practice for personal development, institutional management.

  11. One of the best things I’ve read in the past year or so, period. I’m going to show this to the next professional dissatisfaction-monger who lays into me for reading “12 Rules…”

  12. This is one of the best biographical articles I’ve read recently on anybody, let alone peterson. While dense, it’s astute, well-researched, and impeccably well reasoned. I can’t remember the last time I’ve read an article so methodical and analytical from online or print media, especially from a researcher in the humanities. This was a treat to read from a science grad tired of reading strident, egotistical and highly opinionated pieces totally devoid of research.

  13. Bookmarking this. Peterson is probably the most misrepresented controversial figure I’ve ever come across. Here we have a sharp person having a look and thinking “what’s the big deal?” My thoughts exactly.

  14. “I act as if God exists.” -Jordan Peterson. “Came to believe that a power greater than ourselves could restore us to sanity.” -AA Big Book. If you “get” these two quotes you “get” Jordan Peterson.

  15. You’re overthinking everything here. His notion of truth is very straightforward. He privileges the truth of an individual’s lived experience over material “facts.” The key word here is “individual.” It’s not complicated or borderline postmodern (?!). And that’s just to start with. You’re making everything way more complicated than it needs to be. Take off your PhD mortsr and think from the perspective of regular human, and all will be very clear.

    1. Have you listened to that first Harris podcast? “Very straightforward” are not the words that come to mind. Also, like this (very clearly thought out and articulatef) analysis shows, “clear” and “complicated” are in no way mutually exclusive.

  16. Bloody good review of a human being. I could never figure out why people thought he was controversial until I started to look a bit harder at the motivations of the people who criticize him. All that aside, this article provides some insight and explanation into the ideas propounded by Peterson which I didn’t think were quite right, but couldn’t put my finger on why.


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